Trial by Error: Justice in Post- Qadhafi Libya

Trial by Error: Justice in Post- Qadhafi Libya Middle East/North Africa Report N April 2013 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise Brussels, Belgium Tel:
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Trial by Error: Justice in Post- Qadhafi Libya Middle East/North Africa Report N April 2013 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise Brussels, Belgium Tel: Fax: Table of Contents Executive Summary... i Recommendations... iii I. Introduction... 1 II. Legacies of the Past... 8 A. Italian Colonial Rule ( )... 8 B. Mandatory Libya ( ) and the Constitutional Monarchy ( )... 9 C. Qadhafi and the Revolutionary State ( ) Special courts Attempted Reforms III. Justice after Qadhafi A. Lack of Confidence B. Collapse of the State Security Apparatus C. Impunity D. Detention IV. In Court V. Creeping Lawlessness VI. Conclusion APPENDICES A. Map of Libya B. Glossary of Acronyms C. About the International Crisis Group D. Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on the Middle East and North Africa since E. Crisis Group Board of Trustees... 46 International Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report N April 2013 Executive Summary There are many necessary cures to Libya s pervasive insecurity, but few more urgent than repairing its judicial system. Qadhafi-era victims, distrusting an apparatus they view as a relic, take matters in their hands; some armed groups, sceptical of the state s ability to carry out justice, arbitrarily detain, torture or assassinate presumed Qadhafi loyalists; others, taking advantage of disorder, do violence for political or criminal aims. All this triggers more grievances, further undermining confidence in the state. Breaking this cycle requires multi-pronged action: delivering justice to former regime victims by reforming the judiciary and kick-starting transitional justice; screening out ex-regime loyalists guilty of crimes while avoiding witch-hunts; and reining in armed groups, including those operating under a state umbrella. Unless there is a clear message the justice system is being reformed; no violence or abuse, done in the past by Qadhafi-era officials or in the present by armed groups will be tolerated there is a real risk of escalating targeted assassinations, urban violence and communal conflicts. It has been well over a year since Qadhafi s regime was ousted and still there is no functioning court system in many parts of the country, while armed groups continue to run prisons and enforce their own forms of justice. The severe deficiencies of the current judicial system are rooted, first and foremost, in the failings of the one that, in principle, it has replaced. Under Qadhafi, the judiciary suffered from politicisation of appointments, rampant corruption and the use of extrajudicial means to target political opponents. Four decades of such arbitrary justice served as a burdensome backdrop to the new government s efforts; faced with a choice between summarily dismissing judicial officers who served under Qadhafi or gradually screening them one-by-one, the new authorities so far have opted for the latter. While this was the right decision, it has contributed to public scepticism regarding the scope of change. The situation has been complicated by the proliferation of armed groups. Distrustful of the Qadhafi-era judiciary and police, frustrated by the slow pace of trials against former officials, facing state security forces in disarray and emboldened by their new power, so-called revolutionary brigades and, at times, criminal gangs posing as such have been operating above the law, hindering the work of investigators and judges. They all at once assume the roles of police, prosecutors, judges and jailers. Armed brigades create investigation and arrest units; draft lists of wanted individuals; set up checkpoints or force their way into people s homes to capture presumed outlaws or people suspected of aiding the former regime; and, in some cases, run their own detention facilities in their own headquarters, isolated farms or commandeered former state buildings. Thousands of individuals are in their hands, outside the official legal framework and without benefit of judicial review or basic due process. Assassinations and growing attacks against government security forces have further darkened the picture. This has all the hallmarks of a vicious cycle: impatience with the pace of justice and overall mistrust embolden armed groups; their increased activism undermines the state s ability to function, including on matters of law and order; and this in turn vindicates the armed groups claim that it is their duty to fill the vacuum. Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report N 140, 17 April 2013 Page ii Underlying this state of affairs are two conflicting views of both the source of the problem and the nature of its remedy. Some Prime Minister Ali Zeidan s government among them view the armed groups as a principal cause of growing violence; they advocate their disbandment or absorption into the official security apparatus and the transfer of detainees under their control to the state judiciary. Others, including the brigades themselves, view the armed groups activity as necessary in light of defective state institutions and continued sway of Qadhafi-era officials. These competing narratives translate into divergent approaches to the judiciary: between the government s cautious approach to weeding out former officials on a case-bycase basis and the brigades call for root-and-branch dismissal of all presumed loyalists. To many Libyans, frustrated by how little appears to have changed, the latter view undoubtedly carries appeal. Contradictory government policies towards armed groups partly explain the existence of such polarised views. The National Transitional Council (NTC), Libya s first post-qadhafi governing body, vowed to build a new justice system based on the rule of law. Yet, it simultaneously encouraged consolidation of the brigades, granting official recognition to a large number of armed groups that carried out their own policing activities. Too, it provided them with immunity for crimes arguably carried out in defence of the revolution. The NTC s successor the elected General National Congress (GNC) partially followed in its footsteps, sanctioning efforts by government-affiliated armed groups to seize suspected individuals without regard for due process. Given this, it is a credit to Zeidan s government, appointed in November 2012, that it is trying to buck the tide. He and his justice minister have announced a policy of zero-tolerance toward arbitrary detention or revenge assassinations and made it a priority to transfer into state custody thousands of arbitrarily detained individuals. State security forces have emptied several illegal detention centres in the capital and the legislature passed a law criminalising torture and abductions. It is very much a work in progress, though, and the balance of power does not clearly tilt toward the government. If not carefully managed, and in particular if legitimate grievances regarding the sluggish pace of justice for Qadhafi-era crimes are not addressed, a confrontational approach toward the brigades could well backfire. There is evidence already: the justice ministry and prime minister s office have come under attack, and armed groups threaten to take over prisons currently under government control. Getting this right will entail a form of political multi-tasking. The government will have to provide visible signs that it is addressing shortcomings inherited from the past in order to restore confidence in the justice system and security forces. Criminal prosecutions against high-ranking Qadhafi-era officials are an important step, but they will not suffice; what is needed is a more comprehensive transitional justice process that, in addition to criminal trials, includes appropriate vetting mechanisms for former regime loyalists and truth commissions. At the same time, armed groups even those hailed as heroes of the uprising will need to be held accountable for their actions as well; justice for victims of yesterday s crimes must go hand-in-hand with justice for victims of today s. Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report N 140, 17 April 2013 Page iii Recommendations To restore trust in the judicial system and ensure accountability To the Supreme Judicial Council: 1. Revise the draft law on the judiciary to ensure that vetting mechanisms are not based on political affiliation by providing that, inter alia: a) an independent panel is tasked with vetting members of the judiciary; b) the process is transparent and that disbarred judges have the right to appeal; and c) judges are dismissed on the basis of a fair review of their performance and qualifications and not simply for having served on Qadhafi-era special courts. To the Justice Ministry: 2. Establish, as a matter of urgency, a screening process to end arbitrary detentions. 3. Reactivate currently non-operative courts, and in districts where lingering distrust towards the state judiciary is the cause for their closure, reach out to local armed groups, notables and local councils to promote greater dialogue on the state justice system. 4. Reach out to ordinary citizens through media and civil society groups to explain the current judicial system and restore confidence in what many still perceive as a Qadhafi-era relic. To the General National Congress: 5. Pass a modified bill on the judiciary, as described above, so that judges are vetted by an independent panel, and use this, rather than the Political and Administrative Exclusion Law, as the principal means to weed out corrupt and tainted members of the judiciary. 6. Approve the draft laws on transitional justice and restriction of military jurisdiction to members of the armed forces. To the Office of the General Prosecutor: 7. Ensure that all investigations and criminal trials, including those of former regime officials, respect due process and are conducted consistent with the Code of Criminal Procedure. To governments that have pledged to support rule of law and transitional justice programs in Libya, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), European Union (EU) and international NGOs operating in the country: 8. Provide technical assistance and training to the Fact-Finding and Reconciliation Committee and its local sub-committees and support civil society organisations efforts to document past and recent abuses. Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report N 140, 17 April 2013 Page iv To help rein in armed groups To the General National Congress: 9. Amend law 38/2012 to clarify that perpetrators of crimes such as torture, murder and rape committed during and after the 2011 war will not be granted legal immunity. To the Office of the General Prosecutor: 10. Hold members of armed groups accountable for their actions, notably those involving torture and death in detention. To the Interior Ministry and Defence Ministry: 11. Bar individuals and armed groups responsible for serious crimes from leadership positions in the state security apparatus. 12. Ensure that units of the Supreme Security Committee (SSC), Libya Shield and other government-approved armed groups halt the practice of arresting individuals and storming homes or offices without warrant or evidence of wrongdoing. 13. Ensure that only official security units arrest so-called wanted individuals and that such units adhere strictly to due process. Tripoli/Brussels, 17 April 2013 International Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report N April 2013 Trial by Error: Justice in Post-Qadhafi Libya I. Introduction In October 2012, armed groups led an assault on the town of Bani Walid following its refusal to hand over so-called wanted individuals. The result over 50 dead and more than 10,000 families forced to flee their homes was a stark illustration of, among other problems, the risks persistent disarray in Libya s judiciary entail. 1 More than a year and a half since the fall of Qadhafi s regime, the absence of a functioning court system and the government s inability to curb armed groups which continue to run prisons and enforce their own forms of justice fuel frustration, hampering efforts at national reconciliation and undermining the authority of a still weak and fragmented state. 2 Upon coming to power, Libya s new leaders promised a clean break from the abuses of the past, when political trials, detention and killing of regime opponents were commonplace. Likewise, they repeatedly asserted their commitment to the rule 1 On 25 September 2012, fighters from the town of Misrata vowed to purge Bani Walid of former regime remnants if leaders of the city, which they accuse of being a pro-qadhafi stronghold, refused to hand over those responsible for the death of Omran Shaaban. He was a former rebel from Misrata credited with capturing Qadhafi. Injured and detained in Bani Walid, he died of his wounds after his release. The General National Congress (GNC) supported the demands, issuing GNC Decree 7/2012, authorising force to capture those allegedly responsible for his death. The decree stated that the defence ministry and the interior ministry are tasked with the arrest of those responsible for the kidnapping and torture of the martyr [Shaaban] and his companions, and the arrest of others wanted by justice, who must be handed over to the judiciary within ten days from the issuance of the decree. Likewise prisoners still being held in Bani Walid must be released. The two ministries are authorised to take all appropriate measures, including the use of force if necessary to implement this decree. Misratan fighters from the Libya Shield Forces (LSF), a coalition of armed groups that operates under the chief of staff s authority, imposed a three-week siege on the outskirts of the town. They cut off electricity, water and food supplies in an attempt to pressure the town s authorities to hand over the alleged fugitives. Reconciliation councils and GNC President Mohammed Magarief failed to broker a peaceful agreement. Despite the siege and threats of attack, Bani Walid tribal elders refused to hand over their men to what they considered lawless militias and called for a proper investigation. They also were reluctant to hand them over to a state that in their words had a broken judicial system. After several rounds of negotiations, they stated their willingness to allow the army enter the town and to hand over those individuals for whom the prosecutor would sign an arrest warrant. Misratan authorities refused the proposal, and the LSF, with some army backing, launched a full-scale attack, October. According to the government spokesperson, speaking immediately after the attack, around 50 people died in the clashes, but no official death toll was ever established. Crisis Group interviews, GNC members, Supreme Security Council (SSC) commanders, LSF members, tribal leaders, judges and prosecutors, Tripoli, Zliten and Bani Walid, November-December 2012; Nasr al-manaa, government spokesperson at televised joint press conference, Tripoli, 24 October A similar refusal to hand over wanted individuals triggered armed clashes in Tripoli s central Zawiya Street neighbourhood on 4 November 2012, in the coastal city of Khoms the next day, and again in Bani Walid in mid-december In early 2013, LSF forces from Zawiya claimed that four people died, including an LSF commander, in gunfights following an attempt to arrest a wanted resident of the nearby town of Ajaylat; however, people familiar with the incident claim the clashes were over drug routes. Crisis Group interviews, tribal leaders, security forces, Tripoli and Sabratha, January For earlier analysis of communal clashes, including those in Bani Walid, see Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report N 130, Divided We Stand: Libya s Enduring Conflicts, 14 September 2012. Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report N 140, 17 April 2013 Page 2 of law. Visiting a new detention facility in July 2012 on the eve of the country s first election, former Prime Minister al-keeb said, proper justice is one of the reasons why this revolution started and one of the reasons why we ended where we are. 3 Echoing those words, the new prime minister, Ali Zeidan, vowed to turn Libya into a state of law (dawlat qanun). 4 Such pledges are enshrined in the August 2011 Interim Constitutional Declaration, according to which there shall be no crime or penalty except by virtue of the text of the law, and judges shall be independent, subject to no other authority but the law and conscience. 5 The authorities undoubtedly have made progress in several respects; notably, the conditions in which high-ranking prisoners are held clearly have improved, and the Supreme Court has gained greater independence. Moreover, following a December 2012 Supreme Court ruling that declared unconstitutional certain procedures used in trials against senior Qadhafi-era officials (procedures bequeathed by the former regime), judges set out to rectify them. 6 Yet, these achievements notwithstanding, much judicial reform still awaits. Part of the problem involves the long history of political interference and corruption the current system inherited and that needs serious correction. Also, views on appropriate remedies diverge. 3 See Libya justice system stagnant despite funding, Al-Jazeera, 1 July Protests against the detention of a prominent lawyer and human rights activist, Fathi Terbil, whom Qadhafi-era security officials in Benghazi called in for questioning on 15 February 2011, were a precursor to the larger anti-regime protests that erupted in the eastern city over subsequent days. Terbil had represented families of the victims of the Abu Salim 1996 prison massacre during which security officials killed over 1,200 detainees following a prison riot. The quest for justice became a central theme of the 2011 uprising; these aspirations were symbolised by the transformation of Benghazi s courthouse into the uprising s operations centre. The choice of former Justice Minister Mustafa Abdel Jalil to head the National Transitional Council (NTC), the self-proclaimed assembly that led the fight against the regime, was telling; in 2010, he had clashed with Qadhafi over judicial reform. The appointments to the NTC of Terbil and Ahmed Zoubair, Libya s longest serving political prisoner, were equally significant. 4 See public addresses broadcast on Libya Wataniya radio channel, 5 January Libya state of law and justice and respect of human rights is also the motto of the strategic plan of the justice ministry. 5 Respectively Articles 31 and 32 of the Interim Constitutional Declaration, approved and announced by the NTC on 3 August 2011, henceforth Constitutional Declaration (2011). The 37 articles are the key governance principles until adoption of a permanent constitution and election of representative bodies. 6 Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, ruling 59/25, 23 December Although in 2005 Libya abolished the People s Court (mahkama al-shaab) and the people s prosecution office (a separate office for cases heard in the People s Court), the 1988 law regulating the People s Court was not scrapped. As a result, even after the court ceased to exist, ordinary prosecutors continued to adjudicate most criminal offences, including political crimes, pursuant to the People s Court s procedures as opposed to those regulating ordinary criminal prosecution. Specifically, suspects appearing before a People s Court could be detained for longer periods without judicial review and did not have a right to a lawyer during interrogations; likewise, prosecutors did not need to go through an indictment chamber to bring a case to court. People s Court procedures continued to be used until a 23 December 2012 Supreme Court ruling. Crisis Group interview, senior ministry of justice official, legal scholar, January The Supreme Court ruling should affect all cases against Qadhafi-era officials that have reached trial phase. These include cases against former intelligence chief Abu Zeid Dorda, former Foreign Minister Abdel Ati al
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