The Handbook of Security [Sample Pages 146-178 the Study of Intelligence and Its Contribution to Security by Jame D. Calder]

7 The Study of Intelligence and Its Contributions to Security James D. Calder Introduction In 2001 the United States and the world were reminded that major acts of terror- ism cause severe emotional and physical devastation in ways that are somewhat similar to the effects of all-out military invasion. In the United States at the time, comparisons between the Twin Towers attack and the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack were not overlooked. In each case enemies achieved strategic surprise by bold violatio
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  7 The Study of Intelligence and ItsContributions to Security  James D. Calder  Introduction In 2001 the United States and the world were reminded that major acts of terror-ism cause severe emotional and physical devastation in ways that are somewhatsimilar to the effects of all-out military invasion. In the United States at the time,comparisons between the Twin Towers attack and the 1941 Pearl Harbor attackwere not overlooked. In each case enemies achieved strategic surprise by boldviolations of national (or external) and domestic (or internal) security. Author-ities were criticized for actions or inactions associated with implementing defen-sive measures, for the adequacy of oversight of intelligence systems, and forproper outfitting of all elements of domestic or homeland security. In the UnitedStates and the United Kingdom, especially, intelligence and security servicesencountered blistering probes by legislative bodies. Most questions concernedwhat was known, when it was known, and what decisions were taken. The USCongress altered dramatically the organizational structure of the US intelligencecommunity, and the US Department of Homeland security consolidated domes-tic security functions and rose to a new cabinet-rank position in the ExecutiveBranch. Policy-makers set forth priorities to tighten fragmented intelligencereporting practices and to modernize out-dated and largely inefficient internalsecurity capabilities. Multiple congressional inquiries exposed terrorist methods,particularly those aimed at positioning mole-like cells, conspiratorial associationsand how to discover them, and breaches of security procedures and systems.Intelligence and investigative services were challenged on their competence incollecting, evaluating, and reporting circumstances of terrorist planning. Indeed,withering cross-examination of witnesses revealed disturbing weaknesses allacross the security front, giving rise to plans for reorganizing intelligence ana-lysis, internal security, undercover operations, and counter-terrorism measures(Best, 2005; National Commission, 2004).In current times it is safe to assume that domestic security functions will drawcloser in partnership with the intelligence services in the larger framework of national security protection. Each element will be asked to give new thought toimportant new questions, and to reflect more deeply on how they sift and cor- 146  relate evidence, and how they report findings to key public and private deci-sion-makers. If it is not already obvious, the national security intelligenceelement will have an advantage in these activities because of its history of research and analysis (R & A) and its well-rooted experience in informing thehighest levels of the policy process. There can be no claim that intelligence R &A has always performed up to expectations, however, or that it has been error-free, but they have evolved to indispensability and to an overall standing of reli-ability in national security decision-making. The domestic security realm, onthe other hand, has neither a comparable history nor an institutional focus on R& A to inform decision-making. Consequently, domestic security managementis painfully hindered and marked by marginal credibility in circles of high-leveldecision-making in the public and private sectors. The expectation, and thefocus of this chapter, is the possibilities for improving domestic security in amanner that is comparable to the evolution since World War II in the intelli-gence field. A first order of business will be domestic security’s commitment toan institutionalized orientation to independent R & A conducted within organi-zations similar in design and function to the current intelligence community’s R& A units. A giant step of this kind will require, of course, a change in mind-set,large investments of human and monetary resources, and an argument fordoing so (George, 2004). This chapter is largely about the latter issue. The intel-lectual capital for taking the leap is available but it remains to be organized,focused, and underwritten.Discussion about this change should begin by examining the evolution of some of the key features of national security intelligence services, most notablythe analytical functions (Anonymous, 1986; Davis, 1995; Ford, 1995; Johnston,2005). In this regard space limitations limit discussion to the American experi-ence, but there is no implication that this is the only setting in which usefullessons can be learned. Sixty years ago the US Congress and the Americannational security leadership formally recognized the need for a major investmentin analytical resources (Jeffreys-Jones, 1989; Johnson, 1989a; Overton, 1992). Theconcept of a centralized R & A branch was ultimately located in the CentralIntelligence Agency’s Directorate of Intelligence (DI) (Ransom, 1958; Shulsky,1991; Taubman, 2003; Thomas, 1995). 1 Positioned as a resource to investigateand interpret conditions of the world and national security threats, the DIevolved rapidly as the most reliable authority for informing major decisionsmade by the President and the National Security Council. The analytical func-tion was, and continues to be, the most important of four major organizationalactivities of the CIA (Berkowitz and Goodman, 2000). Brevity compels that wedefer discussion of the administrative, operational, scientific and technologicalelements of CIA, 2 suggesting that the reader refer to bibliographies of the massivescholarly literature for additional readings (Calder, 1999). Essentially, the DI serves as a loose comparative organizational model for a R & A function. Itcan serve as a preliminary model for innovating a similar function in the domes-tic security community. Its historical evolution is unique in many respects(Berkowitz and Goodman, 1989). Profoundly, it reached center stage in the US  James D. Calder   147  intelligence community from a position of relative obscurity in less than adecade. Its rapid rise to prominence and respect was largely due to the ideas andleadership of a small band of brilliant analysts and academics (Thomas, 1995).The critical mass of creativity produced a sea change in the demand for andsupply of grounded decision-making, thus causing the intelligence communityto dramatically shift priorities away from wartime operational specializations toresearch and analytical expertise suitable for a post-war national security system(Ransom, 1958; Darling, 1990; Westfield, 1995). Close study of the intelligence community reveals a history sharply contrastedwith developments in domestic security. In the latter case, regular and nearlyexclusive investments were made, first, in labor-intensive human resources, andsecond, in technologies to replace the high costs and errors of human interven-tions. Security leaders responded to the demands of private and public clientswho favored immediate operational performance regardless of evidence of effec-tiveness or value. The horizons of response were generally limited to low-leveldomestic roles in what was termed ‘crime prevention’ and to a few roles in inter-nal security where human and other threats were regarded as part of the overallnational security picture (i.e., defence plants, nuclear facilities, transportation,waterfronts, airports, etc.). While growing and diversifying at a rate substantiallyfaster than police organizations, the domestic security field ignored the growingneed for an institutional framework for R & A. In simple terms, the field showedlittle interest in evaluating its perceived accomplishments and its productivity.Rarely did it search library resources for vetted research to inform decision-making processes. From time to time, major security problems arose, such asrising crime rates, aircraft hijackings, executive hostage takings, and embassybombings. The focus, however, was always on quick, post-event solutions and tophysical security measures for preventing mainly property crime. Occasionally,security experts were invited to propose incremental and profit-generatingresponses to white-collar crime schemes, to respond to public fears about violentcrime, and to advise the political community on human and technological secu-rity resources. Security service companies, both in the US and abroad, grew everlarger to meet the operational expectations of the marketplace, all fixed on busi-ness priorities of profitability and competitive positions. The business of security,in fact, controlled the direction of security advancement (George and Button,2000; Institute, 1974; Johnston, 1992; Jones and Newburn, 1998; Kakalik andWildhorn, 1977; Shearing and Stenning, 1987).Grounding domestic security’s decision-making in an evidence-based approachand methodology was not often considered, thus not accomplished. The fault laymainly in ignoring what had been so central to post-war national security think-ing: significant investment in R & A. The vast majority of funding was put intooperations and technological devices for sale in the marketplace. Only in recentyears has the field shown interest in research, as evidenced by a small butgrowing base of vetted literature appearing in scholarly journals. The largerfailure to muster broad support for research and its translation into decisionprocesses has not slowed security’s self-proclaimed march toward professional 148 The Handbook of Security   standing, however. This cart-before-the-horse result is not unique to domesticsecurity. Policing and corrections, two related criminal justice functions, havealso claimed professional standing despite the fact that more than three decadesof significant intellectual investment followed the proclamation. Domestic secu-rity’s failures stemmed from ignoring an evidence-based approach to linking R & A to operational productivity. Most assuredly it failed to lead in the use of scientific findings in the assessment and reduction of security risks, choosinginstead to follow events and market trends.Rudiments of a new research commitment are straining for recognition.Substantial work remains, however, to design of an intensive research-analysisorganization similar to units in the intelligence community, to create a central-ized library of vetted scientific knowledge, and to underwrite a cadre of researchscholars to carry out a focused research agenda. 3 In the end, the most importantobjective is for the domestic security community to have an identified andrespected seat at all executive and policy-making tables where grounded R & Acontributes significantly to domestic security decisions. True professional devel-opment, a status clearly evident in the intelligence community by the 1950s, willcome when the domestic security profession recognizes that its central redeem-ing value is the credibility of its critical decisions. Such recognition is widelyevident in other areas of human service delivery, such as education, policing,public health, nursing, and social work. At present the domestic security commu-nity, including some of its main branches in crime prevention, economic crimeinvestigations and systems, private security services, information collection, andtechnological innovations and applications, cannot claim to have centers of cen-tralized R & A to which decision makers can turn. To move toward a new level of credibility in critical decision circles, it must give thought to transforming its long record of operational achievements into research questions, discard associations with widely accepted myths about what does or does not work inreducing risks, bring together scattered ideas about its place in community andnational protection, focus and expand its currently unorganized body of research, assemble its currently scattered group of researchers and thinkers, andaim to strengthen its weak standing in the academic community.In the following discussion, the two sectors of security, one domestic and theother international, will be compared. The objective is to stimulate new thinkingabout what domestic security management may wish to consider in terms of R & A priorities. Research and analysis, as generally practiced by CIA’s DI, is aconcerted, intensive, and never-ending process (Dulles, 1963; Lowenthal, 2003a).This is also true in the US Defense Intelligence Agency, and to lesser degrees of intensity and scope in many other branches of national security advisement.Each of these activities depends upon recruiting talented analysts from the bestresearch institutions in the nation (Blash, 1993; Bodnar, 2003). Each employs thelatest information technologies for mining data collected from human (e.g. caseofficers, diplomats, attaches, and spies) and technological devices (e.g. satellites,aircraft, ground equipment, signaling devices, etc.), and each employs a fullrange of methodologies (e.g. network analysis, opportunity analysis, linchpin  James D. Calder   149


Jul 26, 2017
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